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Abstract
Based on local archival documents and ﬁeldwork con-
ducted in Shaanxi Province’s Baishui County, this article
examines how large-scale water and soil conservation cam-
paigns launched in Northwest China’s Loess Plateau region
during the Mao era (1949–76) affected agrarian environ-
ments and how rural communities experienced and
responded to these transformations. By mobilizing rural
communities to combat water and soil loss, China’s leaders
expected conservation to limit sedimentation along the
Yellow River’s lower reaches and increase agricultural yields
to support their vigorous program of industrialization.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, local opposition to these
efforts to alter human interactions with the land centered
on contradictions between the long-term objectives of con-
servation campaigns and the priority that the rural popu-
lace placed on ensuring subsistence. With residents called
on to attend to conservation work instead of other produc-
tion activities, divergent imperatives translated into intense
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competition over how to use the land and allocate labor
power. Even if conservation programs in Baishui, as in other
parts of China, drew on lay knowledge and practice, these
environmental management polices consistently privileged
the state’s developmentalist agenda over the welfare of ru-
ral communities. In this manner, Mao-era water and soil
conservation supported, and was inseparable from, an ex-
tractive political economy that intensiﬁed contradictions
between the rural and urban, agriculture and industry.
Rather than giving voice to vulnerable populations and eq-
uitably distributing costs and beneﬁts, Mao-era water and
soil conservation exacerbated the burdens placed on mar-
ginalized rural communities.
INTRODUCTION
During the 1950s and 1960s, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) launched large-scale water and soil conservation campaigns
in Shaanxi province and other parts of Northwest China’s Loess
Plateau region to build terraces and implement other land- and
water-management measures.1 By mobilizing the rural populace to
combat erosion, China’s leaders anticipated that conservation meas-
ures would limit sedimentation along the Yellow River’s lower
reaches, prolong the life of dam and reservoir megaprojects con-
structed during the 1950s, and increase agricultural yields to sup-
port the PRC’s vigorous program of industrialization.2 Conservation
programs implemented as part of China’s drive toward revolution
and economic development struck at how people used the most ba-
sic resources of all: land and water. Based on fieldwork in Gounan
and Beiqian villages, located on opposite sides of one of the many
gullies that crisscross Shaanxi’s Baishui County, along with docu-
ments from the Shaanxi Provincial Archives and the Baishui
County Archives, this article examines how water and soil conser-
vation during the Mao period (1949–76) affected agrarian environ-
ments and how rural communities experienced and responded to
these transformations.
Environmental historians of Africa have demonstrated that efforts
to combat erosion through conservation measures, which figured
prominently in colonial development programs from the 1930s to
the 1950s, met with widespread resistance.3 Historians of the
American West have likewise detailed the economic, cultural, and en-
vironmental consequences of the US federal government’s attempts
to deal with erosion and overgrazing on the Navajo Reservation
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during the New Deal Era.4 Under what circumstances did similar op-
position emerge in China? Conversely, under what circumstances did
officials and local cadres collaborate effectively with rural people to
implement conservation measures?
As in other times and places, the PRC state had difficulties imple-
menting water and soil conservation programs. Throughout the
1950s and 1960s, opposition to conservation in Baishui centered on
what contemporaries, employing an important Maoist category,
termed contradictions (maodun). The most fundamental was the con-
tradiction between the state’s long-term developmental agenda and
the priority the rural populace placed on forms of agricultural and
non-agricultural production that would ensure their immediate sub-
sistence. These divergent imperatives translated into disagreement
over how to use land and allocate labor power. To convince villagers
to take part in the work of transforming the landscape, county offi-
cials and local cadres skillfully combined economic incentives, politi-
cal instruction, and mass mobilization.
Water and soil conservation in Baishui displayed the concern with
systematizing and extending peasant “experience” (jingyan) that
Sigrid Schmalzer identifies in Mao-era efforts to promote agricultural
terracing.5 But, even if local leaders in Baishui, as in other parts of
China, drew on lay knowledge and practice to promote conservation,
these environmental management policies privileged the state’s
developmentalist goals over the welfare of rural communities.
Expanding agricultural production in the fragile environment of the
Loess Plateau necessitated water and soil conservation to control ero-
sion, and coordinating these programs required higher-level state in-
tervention. But the PRC’s extractive grain procurement policies
meant that the increased grain yields that conservation made possible
did not accrue to rural residents. Mao-era water and soil conservation
programs supported, and were inseparable from, an extractive politi-
cal economy that intensified contradictions between rural and urban,
and agriculture and industry.6
MASS EXPERIENCE IN WATER AND SOIL
CONSERVATION
Baishui is situated in the lower-middle reaches of the Luo River,
which flows some 680 kilometers through the Loess Plateau before
joining the Wei River on central Shaanxi’s Guangzhong Plain. Gullies
between 100 and 220 meters in depth occupy half the county and dis-
sect its landscape into a series of plateaus and ridges. As in other parts
of the Loess Plateau, porous and friable loess soils combine with frag-
mented topography and poor vegetation cover to make the land
highly susceptible to erosion. The resulting water and soil loss
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hamper agricultural production and contribute to Baishui’s relative
poverty (figure 1).7 A 1953 survey investigation conducted by the
PRC’s Yellow River Conservancy Commission noted that outside of
Guangzhong, in the hill-gully and plateau-gully areas of the Luo
River’s upper and middle reaches, “irrational utilization by humans”
had deteriorated soil structures, which in turn weakened drought re-
sistance and water-retention capacity.8 Because the land was not
“rationally utilized,” the destruction of vegetation intensified ero-
sion, which, as the report stated, influenced “social development and
peasants’ livelihoods.”9
However, as the survey also noted, due to “differences in top-
ography,” Baishui and other areas in the Luo River’s lower-middle
reaches suffered “lighter harm from nature” compared to its upper
reaches. The populace had “rich experience” conserving water and
soil, so erosion was less severe. Residents already managed over 90
percent of the gullies, and most of them had stopped expanding.10
People in Baishui, for instance, had popularized sayings to conserve
water and soil and safeguard agricultural production, such as one that
cautioned: “If the land does not have lips [that is, terracing], people
will starve.” Throughout the plateau-gully area in the Luo River’s
middle reaches, experience had proven the efficacy of terracing to
conserve water and soil.11 In addition to terraces, some residents built
check dams in gullies, while Gounan and other villages dug water cel-
lars (a type of well) and ponds to catch runoff. Because the water table
Figure 1. Map showing location of Baishui County. Credit: Map drawn by Rao Su.
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was low on the plateaus and residents had to travel long distances to
obtain water, the water cellars and ponds were mainly intended to
store drinking water, but they also limited runoff.12
However, the Yellow River Conservancy Commission’s investiga-
tors also stressed the limits of existing water and soil conservation
methods. Local officials lacked awareness of conservation, did not of-
fer technical guidance, and did not carry out “comprehensive
planning” to combine conservation with agriculture, so methods
were “partial and scattered.” Typical of the Chinese Communist
Party’s thinking in the 1950s, the survey alleged that the property sys-
tem based on small farm households fostered “peasant ideology and
customs” that were at odds with conservation’s “mass character and
long-term character.” To resolve the contradictions between individ-
ual versus collective and short-term versus long-term interests, inves-
tigators recommended combining conservation with agricultural
production “in a planned way to develop water and soil conservation
work with a mass character.” The PRC’s mutual aid and cooperative
movement, the survey concluded, would realize this goal.13
On the surface, Gounan village presented an ideal example of
“collectivized” and “mass-character” conservation work in action (fig-
ure 2). Gounan’s residents still speak with pride about a poor peasant
named Yang Lingjun (1889–?) who, after a severe drought struck
Shaanxi in 1929, sold his land on the plateau and moved into a gully
called Tuqiaogou (Earthen Bridge Gully). Yang and his family began
cultivating one hundred mu (6.667 hectares) of sloping land and
gradually built terraces and planted trees on it to control water and
soil loss.14 But Yang’s measures covered only a small portion of
Tuqiaogou, and, as in other parts of Baishui, erosion threatened the
cultivated land.15 Speaking of Tuqiaogou, Baishui’s county head Li
Chongshu noted in 1957 that, “since vegetation cover is poor, water
and soil loss are relatively severe.”16 Although it is unclear how the
figures were calculated, Li stated that over sixteen thousand cubic
meters of soil eroded annually from Tuqiaogou, washing away over
792 tons of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium—equivalent to fif-
teen times the amount of fertilizer applied to the watershed every
year. As a result, pre-1949 grain production averaged a meager forty
to fifty jin (twenty to twenty-five kilograms) per mu (0.06 hectares).17
Beginning in 1953, in tandem with the organization of agricultural
cooperatives, Baishui’s county leaders mobilized the populace to dig
trenches and construct terraces on slopes. As one elderly Baishui resi-
dent recalled, local leaders “led all the village’s cooperative members
to go to war against Tuqiaogou, advancing militarily against nature,
demanding productivity from barren hills and barren gullies, with ev-
eryone going all out and getting at it.”18 Over several years, according
to county head Li Chongshu, “poor gullies and bad pieces [of land]”
were changed into a “fortunate situation” in which households had
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water cellars, villages had ponds, land was terraced, gullies had dams,
and trees grew beside embankments. Through terracing and afforesta-
tion, Gounan’s residents ensured that water did not run off the pla-
teaus and that the soil did not wash down slopes.19 With water and
soil loss in check, production increased. By 1956, as interviews with
elderly residents of Gounan confirm, grain output per mu reached be-
tween 150 and 160 jin (75–80 kilograms).20
Gounan’s emergence as a model for other locales to study and emu-
late lends insight into the processes through which local knowledge
about terracing and other techniques was, to borrow Schmalzer’s
phrase, “collected and then transformed.”21 Initially, Baishui leaders
believed they did not have enough experience promoting water and
soil conservation. For this reason, as Li Chongshu explained, they
“deputed technical cadres deep into the field to summarize the expe-
rience of the local masses.” Afterwards, leaders “affirmed and exten-
ded” this experience. As conservation efforts at Tuqiaogou moved
ahead, county leaders extoled Yang Lingjun as a model. As Li de-
scribed it, twenty years of labor had turned Yang’s inclined land into
terraces with productivity more than double that of the fields on the
Figure 2. Map showing location of Gounan and Beiqian villages. Credit: Map drawn by Rao Su.
Environmental History 0 (January 2020)6
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/envhis/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/envhis/em
z116/5762780 by U
niversity of C
alifornia, San D
iego user on 28 February 2020
tablelands and plateaus (figure 3).22 Yang had dug more than four
hundred water cellars in his lifetime, and though he could not engage
in physical labor in the 1950s due to his old age, he personally went
down into the water cellars to direct younger workers.23
The PRC’s wider national agenda bolstered Yang Lingjun’s achieve-
ments. Instead of enabling Baishui’s residents to keep surplus grain
for future use, the PRC’s unified purchase and sale system (tonggou
tongxiao), instituted in late 1953, obligated agricultural collectives to
deliver grain surpluses to the state at artificially low prices. The state
determined rural residents’ share of the harvest, which they obtained
from the collectives. This agricultural development strategy, later ex-
emplified by the slogan “take grain as the key link” (yi liang wei gang),
gave priority to expanding cultivated acreage to increase grain pro-
duction. Compulsory procurement of low-priced grain by the state—
an implicit tax—made the rural populace indirectly pay for the cost
of the PRC’s early industrialization drive.24
Materials designating Yang Lingjun as an “advanced producer” in
1958 reinforced values that supported the PRC state’s economic
agenda. Official documents praised the old man for rationally utiliz-
ing land and “accumulating abundant water and soil conservation
experience to ensure income.” But they also commended Yang for
volunteering to pay two hundred jin (one hundred kilograms) of
grain on top of his original tax obligations in 1949, which he called
his “glorious responsibility.”25 Valorizing and promoting models like
Yang gave state agents a way to utilize local expertise, while simulta-
neously pursuing higher-level agendas. Local knowledge served as the
basis for conservation measures that limited erosion and boosted
yields, but acted primarily as a means of increasing surpluses for state
extraction. Affirmation of peasant experience promoted the PRC’s
Figure 3. Former site of Yang Lingjun’s terraces in Gounan village, which Baishui County’s local leaders
extoled as a model for water and soil conservation during the 1950s. Credit: Photograph by the author,
January 2016.
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pursuit of economic development over and above the welfare of rural
communities.
Furthermore, with the Yellow River water control plan adopted by
the PRC’s State Council in 1955, the central government stepped up
the tempo of water and soil conservation projects. Mao Zedong sig-
naled the importance of these initiatives in 1956 when he declared:
“We must pay attention to water and soil conservation work.”26
Mobilizing the Loess Plateau’s populace for conservation campaigns
was to limit erosion and downstream siltation to preserve the life of
the Sanmenxia dam and reservoir, which commenced construction
in 1957.27 To this end, in the mid-1950s, the Yellow River
Conservancy Commission’s Northwest Engineering Bureau assisted
Baishui in formulating plans to manage Tuqiaogou.28 After summa-
rizing Yang Lingjun’s experience, Baishui convened three on-the-spot
meetings at Tuqiaogou in 1956, which more than 420 cadres
attended. At a training class attended by forty-three cadres, Yang in-
troduced his management techniques and their results.29 Li
Chongshu claimed that this initiative accelerated development of ter-
racing and enabled Baishui to “forcefully assist in realization of the
nation’s great plan to fundamentally control Yellow River
disasters.”30
Local leaders, for their part, actively publicized Yang Lingjun’s
achievements to attain recognition and notoriety. In 1957, Gounan’s
party secretary Yang Yuesheng (1925–84) attended the Shaanxi
Province Advanced Agricultural Unit Work Conference and intro-
duced Tuqiaogou’s experience, receiving a banner from the PRC State
Council’s Water and Soil Conservation Commission. The following
year, the State Council honored Gounan with a certificate of com-
mendation signed by Zhou Enlai.31 Singled out for this praise,
Gounan fit the pattern that was characteristic of conservation initia-
tives in the 1950s, which fostered model locales for propaganda and
demonstration.32
AGRICULTURE VERSUS CONSERVATION
But, even in a model village like Gounan, problems existed. First,
local leaders had to resolve what they called the “temporary contra-
diction between water and soil conservation and agricultural
production.” Conservation demanded labor power in all four seasons.
But, after cooperativization, as Li Chongshu pointed out in 1957, ag-
riculture witnessed “a new high tide” and double-cropping increased,
which decreased fallow land area and made field-engineering projects
difficult. The problem was that labor and land could be used for con-
servation or farming but not for both simultaneously. Crops could
not grow on land that was dug up to build terraces or embankments.
Environmental History 0 (January 2020)8
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“If this contradiction is not appropriately solved,” Li cautioned, “it
will influence agricultural production; or else it will squeeze out water
and soil conservation.”33
Li outlined the methods adopted to resolve this contradiction.
Based on farming needs, village-level cadres who led production
teams determined which projects were most urgent and which re-
quired comprehensive planning. They also varied the timing of work
to ensure that the conservation work did not alter or occupy the land
needed for cultivation. In summer and autumn, people constructed
embankments and terraces. In autumn and spring, they built silt
dams and larger-scale projects. In winter and spring, they dug water
cellars and ponds or filled collapses. Implementation also had to be
“flexibly initiate[d] based on concrete circumstances.” In 1956, for in-
stance, heavy rains delayed the summer harvest until the time when
late autumn crops had to be planted. In response, cadres adopted the
slogans “when land is empty construct” and “construct first and sow
the land early for millet and broom-corn millet; construct afterwards
and sow the land later for oats and winter wheat.” To save time,
cadres instructed cultivators to leave aside a piece of land wherever
field-engineering projects were done and, after earth was dug up, sow
it with oats. As a result, conservation did not interfere with farming,
and “the masses were satisfied.”34
Meeting conservation targets likewise required carefully adjusting
work schedules and incentives. Cadres had to “rationally handle la-
bor compensation” to ensure the conservation work met quality
standards and to “solve [the issue of] insufficient labor power.” To
this end, county leaders combined “temporary assaults” during slack
periods in the agricultural calendar with year-round management.
These assaults organized work teams for specific projects, while coop-
eratives allocated labor for conservation as part of their annual plans.
This arrangement, wrote Li, “avoided the shortcoming of cooperative
members worrying that work points were not evenly distributed.” But
planning alone was not enough. To resolve contradictions surround-
ing conservation and convince residents of its importance, cadres
had to “educate peasants about the identity between individual bene-
fit and collective benefit, as well as their immediate benefit and long-
term benefit.”35
Conservation quotas had to consider each locale’s “special charac-
teristics,” the character of the soil, the work’s technical nature, the
technical proficiency of the local people, and the quotas set for other
farm work. Conservation projects entailed heavy labor so, “in
principle,” they counted for more work points than other tasks.
Compensation differed depending on when projects would reap ben-
efits. For example, most production teams recorded field-engineering
projects like terraces and embankments as agricultural work, with
payment distributed in the same year. Work points for projects that
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yielded benefits later—silt dams, gully head defenses, ponds, and
check dams—were mostly recorded as “capital construction work”
and distributed amongst all laborers over a period of two to three
years.36 But county leaders soon opted to compensate all conserva-
tion work in the current year since waiting to distribute work points
reduced labor effectiveness.37
Finally, Li Chongshu urged local leaders to “strengthen ideological
education of the masses” to affirm confidence in “the struggle to
manage gullies and thoroughly eradicate natural disasters.”
Tuqiaogou’s experience showed that conservation could transform
the environment in the foreseeable future. Every locale in Baishui
had to “carry out terracing and greening of the county’s gullies just
like has been done in Tuqiaogou, diligently completing the water and
soil conservation mission to support realization of Yellow River con-
trol projects and improve the people’s livelihood.”38 Realizing this
goal required detailed planning, the adjustment of economic incen-
tives, and ideological instruction.
LEAPING FORWARD AND FOLLOWING RED
FLAGS
The Great Leap Forward (1958–61) ramped up the intensity of wa-
ter and soil conservation work in Shaanxi and across the Loess
Plateau. But the campaign took a heavy toll on the rural populace.
Newly formed People’s Communes organized their members into
quasi-military units (platoons, battalions, regiments, squads, and so
on) and mobilized them to manage small watersheds as their
“theaters of operation.”39 Since the early 1950s, local leaders and
higher-level authorities in Shaanxi had been promoting Gounan’s ex-
perience digging water cellars as a model. But, during the Great Leap
Forward, villagers all over Shaanxi had to follow Gounan’s example
and meet targets for water cellars whether they needed them or not.
Residents complained: “We’ve dug so many ‘black holes.’ They oc-
cupy land, donkeys fall into them, and they’re useless. It’s really a
waste of manpower and resources.”40 A former female activist from
Baishui’s Fumeng village recalled getting injured when she fell into a
water cellar that she was digging with her husband during this
campaign.41
At the same time, the Great Leap Forward often involved com-
munes appropriating labor and resources from subordinate units with
little or no remuneration. Collective members in Beiqian, which
formed a high-level cooperative with Gounan from 1956 to 1959,
“disliked that the retained grain standard [left for consumption] was
too low and that water and soil conservation was heavy work that
[made them] eat a lot, and so were not willing to go to the fields.”42
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When drought struck in 1960 and the state’s requisitioning of grain
did not relent, the threat of a subsistence crisis brought conservation
work to a standstill.43 Although demographic data and oral histories
indicate that Baishui did not witness the famine-related mortality
seen elsewhere in China, it still suffered extreme dearth and hun-
ger.44 The famine’s relatively moderate severity in Baishui mirrored
much of Shaanxi, where party leaders did not adopt the Great Leap
Forward’s most radical policies.45
Although residents got a respite from conservation work for several
years following the Great Leap Forward, the PRC government issued a
new series of directives on water and soil conservation in 1963. The
campaign to “Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture”—inspired by a col-
lective that gained nationwide fame for overcoming poverty by turn-
ing rocky hillsides into terraced fields and planting trees—got
underway in 1964, lending further impetus to water and soil conser-
vation efforts.46 In addition to following all of China in studying
Dazhai, Baishui also had to compete with Shaanxi’s Chengcheng
County (located directly to the east), which in 1963 and 1964 gained
nationwide renown as a “red flag” in terrace construction.47 But
Baishui leaders still presented Tuqiaogou as an exemplar. Along with
encouraging cadres and the populace to learn from Dazhai, Baishui
organized fourteen thousand people to make three visits to
Chengcheng and three study trips to Gounan.48 Despite disruptions
caused by the Great Leap Forward, conservation campaigns had
regained momentum.
REMAKING A ROTTEN BRIGADE
While Gounan remained a model, conservation campaigns in the
mid-1960s remade the reputation of nearby Beiqian (see figure 2).
Waging what Baishui leaders called “a great decisive battle in water
and soil conservation,” Beiqian formed a capital development team
in the summer of 1965, transferring 135 laborers to “wage war for fifty
days” by building terraces and doing other conservation work. As a re-
sult, Beiqian purportedly “changed in a single leap from a late-
developing brigade into a banner for high-quality, high-speed
development.”49
A 1966 report gives an account of this transformation. Surrounded
by gullies on three sides and plagued with infertile land, bare hills,
and frequent droughts, productivity was low in Beiqian before 1949,
so even in abundant years output per mu was only seventy to eighty
kilograms.50 Given the poor quality of Beiqian’s farmland, other
forms of employment held greater importance.51 Like other parts of
Shaanxi’s “black belt” (hei yaodai) north of the Wei River, Baishui had
coal mines where Beiqian residents worked digging and hauling coal.
The Contradictions of Conservation 11
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Starting in the Tongzhi period of the Qing dynasty (1856–75), people
in Beiqian also earned a living by weaving willow branches into win-
nowing baskets, which found a ready market in central Shaanxi’s
Guanzhong region.52 Although livelihoods improved somewhat after
1949, the report admitted that Beiqian’s impoverished condition had
not fundamentally changed.53
Beginning in 1964, under the slogan “study Dazhai and catch up to
Chengcheng,” discussions between cadres and the masses in Beiqian
centered on three questions: “Why is Beiqian ‘rotten’? Why is it
‘poor’? It was divided from the same brigade as Gounan, so why isn’t
it as good as Gounan?’” The brigade’s party branch organized a meet-
ing at which party member Hao Gaiming reportedly declared: “We
live next to the road. Every day we see trucks transporting lumber
from Huanglong [a forested mountain region northeast of Baishui].
We have so many barren hills and cannot contribute lumber to con-
struct socialism. I feel deeply ashamed.” Although one cannot know
what really transpired, residents allegedly “recognized that to change
the face of Beiqian they had to firmly grasp ideological revolutioniza-
tion and land revolution (i.e. basic construction of farmland).”
Regardless of the veracity of the details, this meeting signaled the be-
ginning of conservation campaigns in Beiqian. For the first five days
of 1965, the party branch held a meeting in which, “using criticism
and self-criticism as a weapon,” the party branch chastised committee
member and brigade leader Luo Qicheng for following “the capitalist
road” and dismissed him from his post. Numerous collective mem-
bers vowed to “change the face of Beiqian.”54
During the period of post-crisis recovery and readjustment that fol-
lowed the Great Leap Forward and famine, the PRC had permitted ru-
ral handicraft production for the market and cultivation of land
outside the collective.55 But with another shift in China’s develop-
ment policies in 1964, which re-emphasized collective production,
these sideline activities came under attack. According to the 1966 re-
port from Beiqian, a “go it alone style” had spread unchecked in the
brigade, with local cadres and other residents opening wasteland
(huang)—a term that referred to all types of uncultivated lands—and
making winnowing baskets on a large scale. Few people took part in
collective production, oxen were thin, and land was infertile.
Residents described the production situation as “treating family
members badly, keeping thin oxen, abandoning crops, and no one
hoeing.”56
During the period of “rehabilitation” from 1961 to 1963, water and
soil conservation work lagged, and individuals throughout Shaanxi
responded to the central economic policies by reclaiming wasteland
outside their collectives to recuperate losses incurred during the
Great Leap Forward. This wasteland consisted of previously untilled
slopes with steep gradients. Reclamation thus destroyed vegetation
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cover on inclined land and accelerated erosion. Following the Great
Leap Forward, short-term subsistence mattered far more to the rural
populace than checking erosion. But the conservation campaign
launched in 1964 targeted this practice.57 Throughout Baishui, dis-
cussions attacked reclaiming wasteland as “capitalist go-it-alone
behavior” that intensified water and soil loss. This politicized lan-
guage pointed to the contradiction that emerged when households
reclaimed inclined slopes for their immediate benefit, while damag-
ing the long-term collective interest. To rectify this situation, authori-
ties compelled residents in 1965 to hand over twenty thousand mu
(1,333 hectares) of reclaimed land to their collectives.58
Three of the five committee members from the Beiqian party branch
and nine of the eleven work team committee members illicitly
reclaimed wasteland. Most cultivated one to four mu (0.06–0.26 hec-
tares), though one household cultivated a whopping thirteen mu (0.86
hectares). Some hired “illegal households” (hei hu) to open wasteland;
some secretly made winnowing baskets at night and slept through
farm work during the day. When it was time to farm, collective leaders
rang the bell for work but no one showed up.59 With people “walking
the wrong road of recklessly opening wasteland and going it alone do-
ing sidelines (fuye),” as reports put it, some among the cadres and the
masses thought “constructing the land is not as good as opening
wasteland” and “doing water and soil conservation is not as good as
doing sidelines.”60 Rural residents across China favored these sideline
activities because, unlike grain production, the state did not impose
hidden taxes on them though compulsory procurements.61
People in Beiqian only engaged in conservation when pressed, the
quality of their work was poor, and their repairs quickly collapsed.
Efforts to crack down on illicit wasteland cultivation in 1963 and
1964 failed. But, in the spring of 1965, the brigade party branch com-
pelled cadres to give back 450 mu (thirty hectares) and formed a col-
lective sideline-production processing organization to regulate these
activities.62 At this point, according to the 1966 report, cadres and
the masses in Beiqian embraced “the ideology of planting fields for
the revolution and planting trees for the revolution” and devoted
their minds to the collective, “opening up a high tide in basic con-
struction of farmland.” But the skepticism toward conservation per-
sisted. Some residents, recalling earlier excesses, remarked that “the
wind of ’58 [that is, the work style of the Great Leap Forward] has
come again” and sarcastically called the tree nursery an “old folks’
home” and a “convalescent hospital.”63
To improve the quality of maintenance work, Beiqian devoted 12
percent of its labor power (seventy-eight people) in the spring of 1965
to a “specialized farmland capital construction team” (tudi jiben
jianshe dui) that worked year-round. During slack periods, the brigade
mobilized all residents for conservation projects. Yet some feared that
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the construction team would not be “mutually advantageous” for
those drafted into it and would negatively influence agricultural pro-
duction. In response, the party branch consolidated the team’s leader-
ship and organized residents to study Mao Zedong’s writings and
engage in military training. When the ground froze in the winter of
1965–66, many in Beiqian asked to stop work. But, as the report main-
tained, after studying Mao’s quintessential parable for remaking nature
through arduous labor, “The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the
Mountains,” they resolved “that even if the land froze to three chi [one
meter] they would not cease work and would not rest until they
grasped a red flag, and they persisted until the 24th day of the twelfth
lunar month before stopping work.”64 Mobilization to transform the
environment once again demanded political instruction and pressure.
When evaluating and recording labor, Beiqian implemented a sys-
tem in which production teams were paid with work points earned in
the spring each summer and with work points earned in the summer
each autumn, ensuring even distribution among production teams
and timely compensation. In this manner, the brigade started to
bring about the “embankment of plateaus, terracing of gully slopes,
and greening of barren slopes and barren hills.” In 1965, grain pro-
duction per mu reportedly averaged 195 jin (97.5 kilograms), which
exceeded the highest recorded levels by 10 percent. The brigade had
“fundamentally altered the backward conditions that led people to
call it ‘rotten Beiqian’ and leapt forward to become a red flag in con-
struction of basic farmland for the whole county.” For two years,
Beiqian had “gone to war against nature” and resolved to “pledge
their life to changing the face of ‘rotten Beiqian’ and to contribute
more to the revolution.”65
At an on-the-spot meeting convened in Baishui in October 1965,
county head Sun Fangmin gave a speech mobilizing the populace for
conservation work, and participants visited Beiqian and Gounan to
observe and learn from their experience. Cheng Zengjie, an assistant
engineer in Shaanxi Province’s Water and Soil Conservation Bureau,
gave a speech that lauded Beiqian and Gounan and promised that if
other brigades in Baishui followed their example they could vastly in-
crease agricultural production by eliminating erosion.66 By devising
ways to resolve the contradiction between the immediate subsistence
needs of rural households and the goals of the collective, the Beiqian
brigade had attained a status coeval with Gounan.
RESOLVING CONSERVATION’S
CONTRADICTIONS
Yet the conservation campaigns of the mid-1960s encountered op-
position. County leaders pointed to what they termed “reactionary
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sayings and behaviors,” such as a belief that conservation “exhausts
people and harms finances; distant water cannot quench present
thirst,” the “fear that it harms fengshui and is not safe,” and the “fear
that it will disrupt borders of fields and buried rocks.”67 One
“counter-revolutionary element” went so far as to “fabricate rumors”
that “doing water and soil conservation is like a snail plowing the
land, suffering hardship for nothing.” Worse yet, he grumbled,
“doing water and soil conservation is for idiots. Not doing anything,
sitting down quietly, and saving two steamed buns would be
better.”68 In difficult times, people complained that “water and soil
conservation is hardship; it expends grain and expends clothing.”
When doing conservation work in better times, they sighed:
“Whenever you see the bowl has a few grains of food in it the ‘wind’
of ’58 [the Great Leap Forward] comes again.”69 Complaints that
grain rations were too low for collective members to do conservation
work reverberate through the sources.
Rather than unmediated voices from the grassroots, these grievan-
ces appeared in documents composed by cadres and officials in re-
sponse to campaigns with specific mandates. Nevertheless, such
sayings offer valuable insight into the sources of rural discontent.
These complaints, along with many others like them, show that some
among Baishui’s populace had little enthusiasm for water and soil
conservation: it was hard, dangerous work that required huge invest-
ments of labor to move massive amounts of earth and brought few
tangible short-term benefits.70 To implement conservation measures,
collectives had to employ political pressure, ideological education,
and propaganda.
Starting in 1964, county leaders pushed rural residents to give up
their practice of taking a well-deserved rest during the slack period to
do conservation work during winter when it would not interfere with
farming. But customary conceptions of agricultural time and frigid
temperatures made working all winter far from appealing. Official
reports attacked this “winter idleness ideology” (dongxian sixiang) and
criticized it for hampering water and soil conservation.71 Describing
the popular unwillingness to do conservation work in winter, one re-
port noted:
Some say: “Since ancient times farmers have had half a year
of hard work and half a year of idleness.” Some say: “After
the autumn crops are harvested and wheat has been planted
it’s a good time for farmers; they can take their food bowl
(mifan wan) and stand by the northern wall to warm them-
selves in the sun.” Some say: “In the dead of winter insects
all dig their holes; can’t people be idle for a few days too?!”
Some say: “In deepest winter the ground is frozen like a brick
and harrows can’t even dig. What can people do?”
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As a result, production teams withdrew from work in the winter,
while male laborers left to haul coal or gather firewood. Cooperative
members went to market to get goods for the New Year, and women
started “spinning yarn, making cloth, and sewing clothes to prepare
for winter and celebrate the New Year.” In this way, “the evil practice
of winter idleness” enveloped the countryside.72 To combat this situ-
ation, cadres organized mass meetings to drive home the message
that “winter idleness is landlords’ and wealthy peasants’ idleness—
poor people cannot be idle all four seasons of the year.”73
As before, local leaders had to resolve “the contradiction of water
and soil conservation and agricultural production competing for
time, competing for land, and competing for labor.”74 In addition to
complaining about doing conservation work in the winter, people
complained during spring that “the land isn’t empty, there’s no way
to do it.” In summer, they grumbled that “farm work is busy, there’s
no time.”75 Given these limitations, cadres pressed production teams
to exploit every available minute. In summer, according to a report
from 1964, “time is tight, work is concentrated, and if any item is not
done well it will lead to great losses in production.” The report recom-
mended that collectives allocate 15 to 20 percent of their labor power
to specialized work teams that would “persist in long-term man-
agement.” Furthermore, because most precipitation came in the sum-
mer, whenever rainfall made farm work impossible, production
teams undertook “comprehensive mobilization for assaults in water
and soil conservation” to build and maintain terraces. Once August
arrived and the amount of farm work decreased, collectives allocated
30 percent of their labor to form specialized work teams and to “fight
a great war” to complete conservation projects, with local leaders
monitoring the work.76
Baishui’s 1965 report on conservation work explained the seasonal-
ity of these campaigns: “After the fall harvest there is labor and there
is land, but the freeze comes early and time for management is short.”
The solution was to start conservation work as early as possible, while
carefully prioritizing the components of each project. In the past,
many people believed that the period in August after the summer har-
vest and before the autumn harvest was “the ‘golden’ season for do-
ing water and soil conservation.” But even if the land lay fallow
during this time of year, labor was in short supply. As the report
stated, “the timeliness of deep plowing and tending autumn crops is
extremely strong, and one season affects two years.” Hence, county
leaders followed Beiqian in advocating a “first specialize; then
assault” method: “After the summer harvest, mainly specialized
teams do the work, and after summer plowing and tending of autumn
crops have basically ended we mobilize the masses for assault-style
management.”77 Rather than demanding absolute adherence to these
guidelines, however, county leaders advised collectives to adjust their
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methods according to local climatic conditions and cropping
schedules.78
Proper compensation for conservation work was similarly complex
and could only be determined through trial and error. As a report on
conservation work related in the summer of 1964, “the problem of
compensation is a big matter of deep concern to the mass of coopera-
tive members, and it is an important problem in relation to project
quality.” Given conservation’s “great intensity and strong technical
character,” collectives in most of Baishui devised “quota manage-
ment systems and engineering quotas,” through “experiment and
democratic consultation,” which were somewhat lower than quotas
for farm work.79 Yet collectives frequently had to adjust their incen-
tive systems to motivate their members for conservation work. Rather
than a set number of work points for each shift, county officials
strongly favored piece-rate systems to stimulate greater activism.80
Gounan, for example, originally stipulated that its members could
earn 3.3 work points for building one zhang (3.33 meters) of terraces,
but the amount proved inadequate, “which influenced quality and
progress, making some people unwilling to take part in water and soil
conservation work because the work points were too low.” When the
quota was changed to four points per zhang, results improved.81
For a time, “emphasizing gullies and overlooking plateaus, over-
looking maintenance, and laxness in re-vegetation measures” also
had a negative influence. In certain areas, “because too many
trenches were dug, level land was turned into low-lying land; high
places lacked soil moisture and in low places seedlings were flooded,
creating human-made decreases in production.” In every instance,
county leaders had to avoid poor planning and implementation and
grapple with “the contradiction between current benefits and long-
term benefits in water and soil conservation work.”82
FROM DROUGHT TO DISSENSION
Nevertheless, frictions rooted in competing land use priorities were
unavoidable. These contradictions grew especially acute in 1966
when drought struck central Shaanxi.83 A report from Shaanxi’s
Baishui County Water and Soil Conservation Work Station from the
fall of 1966—right at the start of the Cultural Revolution—gives a
vivid account of the tensions that emerged due to an intersection be-
tween conservation campaigns and climatic fluctuations.
In 1966, leveling fields, deep plowing, and the construction of the
“four fields” (level bench terraces on slopes, level terraces on plateaus,
dam land, and flood siltation land) commenced in mid- and late
June. But summer grain output had declined by 50–70 percent after
eight months of drought. Farmers tried to make up for the shortfalls
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by expanding the land area sown with autumn crops. Yet drought
also threatened early autumn crops and interfered with the planting
of late autumn crops.84 Faced with these challenges, many rural resi-
dents chafed at conservation projects that required substantial labor
inputs and had adverse short-term consequences for agriculture and
other forms of production.
By late summer, the “cadres and the masses” assumed “a pessimis-
tic and hopeless mood, fearing difficulties and slacking off.” The
Baishui County Water and Soil Conservation Work Station’s report
enumerated their grievances. Some said: “We’ve got bad luck. When
others were serving as team leader there was an abundant harvest.
When we’re serving as team leader, production decreases. Let’s get
through doing it for the next six months and then forget it.” Others
said: “This year only this little bit of grain has been allocated. If we
don’t find a way out before it’s too late, soon we’ll be drinking the
northwest wind [and have nothing to eat]. Working on building
embankments and constructing the land can wait until there’s an
abundant harvest.”85 As harvests declined and scarcity increased,
people wanted to ensure they had food. With the deprivations of the
Great Leap Forward in recent memory, suspicion toward conservation
projects ran deep.
The discontent focused especially on the year-round capital con-
struction teams formed to construct and maintain terraces, silt dams,
and other infrastructure. As the report explained,
there were also some people who complained that water and
soil conservation is heavy work that wastes grain and cloth-
ing, disliked that the capital construction team managed
them strictly so there wasn’t any freedom, and disliked that
other people ridiculed them by calling them “three goods”
labor power: (The three goods are broken goods [daodan
huo], export goods [chukou huo], and substandard goods
[dengwai huo]). Cadres’ work lacked confidence and the
masses shirked from going forward.86
Unsurprisingly, conservation campaigns that forced people to engage
in backbreaking labor and limited their range of activities met with
resistance. Production teams often sent weak laborers and trouble-
makers—the “substandard goods”—to do conservation work, holding
back more capable members to farm.87 Judging from their insults,
people perceived conservation as labor that had no utility in terms of
meeting their most pressing needs. With drought threatening and
crops failing, villagers wanted to grow food or engage in sideline pro-
duction, not level fields or build dams and terraces.
Faced with this discontent, local leaders turned to political mobili-
zation to meet their objectives. Party cadres in Baishui organized 155
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small groups to study Mao’s canonical works and rectify incorrect
attitudes. To address the issue of “disliking hardship and fearing tired-
ness”—to cite but one example—they studied “Serve the People,” “In
Memory of Norman Bethune,” and “The Foolish Old Man Who
Moved the Mountains.”88 The Beiqian brigade was “not afraid that
the weather and the earth were dry” (thus making it harder to dig)
and adopted a “cutting open the belly and digging out the heart”
method to keep “building embankments and constructing the
land.”89 Specifically, since the start of spring, the brigade devised four
“drought work methods”:
1. Take moist soil from a deep pit.
2. Increase the incline of the slope.
3. Build high and dig low.
4. Splash water on the surface of the terrace.
But to follow these steps, people had to haul water fourteen to fifteen
li (7–7.5 kilometers) to apply it to the terraces, an arduous task in a
landscape full of steep hills and gullies.90 The Wujiahe brigade like-
wise resolved that conservation would transform their poor “black
cauldron bottom” land and “change the features [of the
landscape].”91
Baishui’s female residents actively participated in this work. In the
Xifangcheng brigade during the 1966 conservation campaign,
“women’s monthly work turnout increased from seventeen to eigh-
teen days per month to an average of twenty-six days per month,” a
staggering amount given all of the other work that women had to do.
Though it did not make the work less burdensome, labor models pre-
sented a heroic example for other women to follow. Communist
Youth League member Zhu Junying “studied well and worked hard,”
so five times in a row that summer she was “appraised as a ‘five good’
crack troop.” The women’s work team that she led “was also evalu-
ated as a water and soil conservation highest-level advanced
collective.”92 When youths sent pledges to party organs and swore
oaths to work diligently, Zhu resolved that, “if the land isn’t all man-
aged, I won’t get married.”93 She would stay in her native village until
they had remade the land.
Yet popular suspicions did not abate. An old upper-middle peasant
in Beiqian named Luo Sanwa complained that “earning is not as
good as saving. This year’s been so tiring. Doing a few sidelines as
early [as possible] and grasping a little ready-made [income] is the
best policy.”94 When crops failed that summer, some people said:
“This year the mission to be managed is too great. There isn’t labor
power to attend to it.” Others protested that “grain ration standards
are so low. Water and soil conservation is heavy work. We can’t do
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it.”95 Instead of conservation, Luo Sanwa and other residents favored
non-farm work to overcome shortfalls caused by drought-induced
reductions in grain yields.
Labor mobilization also fostered discontent. When a capital con-
struction team drafted “backward youth” to do repair work, a water
and soil conservation technician in the Xiaowadi brigade criticized
the brigade party branch’s leadership, saying things like: “Giving
prominence to politics must also make it prominent in operations.”
In the Wujiahe brigade, “some people with ulterior motives openly
attacked water and soil conservation team personnel, saying: ‘The
people who do water and soil conservation are all broken goods, ex-
port goods, and sub-standard goods,’ scheming to disintegrate the
capital construction team’s organization and damage the water and
soil conservation movement.” In the Daleigong brigade, two
“counter-revolutionary elements” named Gao Jinmin and Liu
Shutang “brazenly enticed the masses” to damage production, and
that summer “farmland capital construction went quiet for a long pe-
riod and strength exerted was not great.” Again, mass mobilization
and political pressure were the chosen remedies. In the autumn of
1966, the Xifangcheng brigade held six mass meetings to promote
conservation work, which more than 910 people attended. The
Daleigong brigade had a mass meeting to struggle against “counter-
revolutionary elements” named Gao Jinmin and Liu Shutang and
detained them. Xiaowadi’s local party branch likewise held a meeting
in the fall of 1966 to “thoroughly settle accounts” with the water and
soil conservation technician’s “anti-party behavior” and dismissed
him from his post. This former technician, whom I interviewed dur-
ing a visit to Xiaowadi, remembered his conflict with the local party
branch leadership and this struggle meeting as the opening salvo of
the Cultural Revolution.96
Ultimately, as the work station’s report put it, under circumstances
“in which agricultural work was varied and toilsome, and labor power
was in short supply,” technical personnel, together with local cadres
and the masses, “rationally allocated labor power to simultaneously
attend to water and soil conservation and agricultural production” so
that neither of them was overlooked.97 However, the documents do
not describe the specific methods used in the autumn of 1966 to rec-
oncile these contradictions.
Throughout the Cultural Revolution, conservation continued each
winter and early spring. A retired professor who once worked in
Shaanxi’s Water and Soil Conservation Bureau, with a stint in Baishui
in 1967 and 1968, insisted that the Cultural Revolution had positive
effects on water and soil conservation because work teams employed
militarized methods, with people’s militia detachments (minbing lian)
overseeing laborers. During the Cultural Revolution, he explained,
“paramilitary organization, personnel stationed at work sites, long
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work periods, and great labor intensity promoted the progress of wa-
ter and soil conservation work.”98 Yet tensions over the allocation of
labor did not disappear. In the winter of 1973, for example, brick
kilns opened by several households in Gounan diverted labor away
from efforts to level farmland, which hampered work turnout and ef-
fectiveness. In response, brigade leaders stopped recording work
points by shift in favor of distributing them on a piecework basis,
held criticism meetings, and engaged in “face-to-face struggle”
against kiln operators.99 The contradiction between the state’s devel-
opmentalist goals and the interests of rural communities remained
unresolved.
CONCLUSION
Beginning in the 1950s, agents of the PRC state identified, appro-
priated, and extended lay knowledge about water and soil conserva-
tion techniques to support large-scale developmental agendas. Local
party leaders actively publicized this “peasant experience” in their
efforts to gain higher-level state recognition and support. But even if
conservation measures drew upon local knowledge and expertise,
state agents in the countryside had a hard time getting other rural res-
idents to accept it. From the first decade of the PRC, a contradiction
existed between water and soil conservation and agricultural produc-
tion. This contradiction became especially acute during the Great
Leap Forward, when militarized conservation campaigns jeopardized
rural livelihoods. In addition to their lingering memories of the hard-
ships of the Great Leap Forward, more than a few Baishui residents
opposed the renewed conservation campaigns launched after 1963
for a simple reason: these programs had little to do with promoting
the welfare of rural communities and did not take their needs and
aspirations into account.
The obstacles that conservation encountered must be understood
with reference to the contradictions within China’s wider political
economy. The PRC’s call to “take grain as the key link” compelled ru-
ral communities to farm sloping fields in the Loess Plateau and do the
backbreaking water and soil conservation work necessary to check
the erosion that inevitably resulted. But since state grain procure-
ments extracted surpluses from the agricultural sector to support in-
dustrial development, conservation programs meant more labor for
rural residents with no real returns. Despite working unceasingly to
control water and soil loss from the 1960s through the 1970s, per cap-
ita grain rations in Baishui were basically stagnant.100 To connect
conservation, sustainability, and social justice, political conditions
must give vulnerable populations a voice and ensure that costs and
benefits are equitably distributed. Mao-era water and soil
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conservation did not measure up to this standard. Instead, conserva-
tion programs undertaken to increase agricultural surpluses for state
extraction and to control the Yellow River aggravated inequalities by
exacerbating the burdens placed upon poor and marginalized rural
communities.
To overcome popular suspicions, Baishui’s county officials and lo-
cal cadres adjusted compensation via work points and applied ideo-
logical pressure to keep water and soil conservation moving forward.
The forms of mobilization employed during the first two decades of
the PRC came to grips with the complexities of seasonal weather pat-
terns and agro-ecological cycles. But unforeseen climatic fluctua-
tions—like the drought that struck in 1966—upset finely tuned plans
and led to the politicization of competing claims. Efforts to bring
complex societies and ecologies into line with state-defined goals and
collective production entailed myriad negotiations and conflicts, in
which nature played an active role. According to Mao, the method
for resolving “the contradiction between society and nature” was
“developing the productive forces.” That was far easier said than
done.101
Micah S. Muscolino is professor and Paul G. Pickowicz Endowed Chair
in modern Chinese history at the University of California, San Diego.
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